






‘Active Intellect’ in Avempace and Averroës: 
An Interpretative Issue
Abstract
This essay is about the understanding of the notion of active	intellect in Ibn Bāǧǧa (Avem-
pace) and Ibn Rušd (Averroës). The traditional interpretation of both Avempace’s and Aver-
roës’ concept of active intellect is that they both understand it as the lowest celestial intel-
ligence which is dator	 formarum, and that man thinks and cognizes intelligibles only by 
“connecting” with it in a quasi-mystic way; cognition being the active intellect’s granting 
ideas (formae or concepts) to man’s intellect. The author believes that both in Avempace’s 
and Averroës’ theory of cognition the notion of active intellect is only the highest function 
of human intellect, not a celestial entity. Based on such a presumption, as well as on the 
analysis of his theory, Avempace’s notion of iṭṭiṣāl	bi-‘aql	fa“āl is interpreted not as a kind of 
mystic “conjunction” or “union” with a separate celestial entity, but as reaching the highest 
level of man’s intellect function in the continuity of the process of thinking. The same goes for 
Averroës’ theory, which is quite clearly presented in his Epistle	on	the	Possibility	of	Conjunc-
tion	with	the	Active	Intellect, where one can find practically direct confirmation for such an 
interpretation, because Averroës says that “conjunction with it [i.e. active intellect] seems to 
resemble more the conjunction of form in matter than it does the conjunction of agent with 
effect. The well-known difference between agent and effect is that the agent is external, but 
here there is no external agent”, or that active intellect “conjoins with us from the outset 
by conjunction of in-existence”. The author concludes that the issue of the active intellect 
in Islamic philosophy is not disambiguous – for different thinkers it was a different concept 
– only the function of the active intellect is always one and the same: producing ideas.
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works,	especially	 in	his	Risālatu-l-‘aql	 (Epistle on the Intellect)	and	 in	Al-




























from	 the	 First	 Principle,2	whose	 emanations	were	 equated	with	 the	 angels.	
(As	such	a	divine	celestial	entity,	in	the	translations	of	Arabic	philosophical	
texts,	it	is	usually	called	the	Active intellect	–	with	a	capital	A	in	translations	
from	Arabic	–	 in	order	 to	stress	 its	being	of	divine	origin).	 It	could	be	said	
that	Al-Fārābī	–	and	after	him	other	Muslim	philosophers	through	Neoplaton-
ist	influences	–	in	a	way	exploited	Aristotle’s	general	theory	of	cognition	for	

















on	 such	 an	 interpretation	 –	 as	well.	This	 interpretation	will	 be	 questioned	
here	 in	 reference	 to	Avempace’s	Risāla iṭṭiṣāl al-‘aql bi-l-insān5	and	Aver-
roës’	Epistle	on the Possibility of Conjunction with the Active Intellect which	
is	known	only	thanks	to	a	mediaeval	Hebrew	translation,	commented	by	four-
teenth-century	Hebrew	 philosopher	Moses	Narboni.6	Avempace’s	 risāla	 is	
traditionally	 translated	as	Conjunction of Intellect with Man	 (how	 this	 title	
should	be	understood	and	translated	is	the	subject	of	this	article).
Avempace’s understanding of intellect 
and levels of cognition
Let	us	see	what	Avempace’s	risāla is	about.











































light:	 the	 light	makes	 potential	 colours	 into	
actual	colours.”
2
Cf.	Al-Fārābī,	On the Perfect State,	 revised	
text	 with	 introduction,	 translation	 and	 com-
mentary	by	Richard	Walzer,	Oxford	Univer-
sity	 Press,	 Oxford	 1985,	 “Commentary”,	 p.	
404–405.
3
Cf.	Majid	Fakhry,	A History of Islamic Phi-
losophy,	 Columbia	 University	 Press,	 New	






Ibn	Bāǧǧa	(Avempace),	La conduite de l’isolé 
et deux autres épîtres,	 introduction,	 critical	
edition	 of	Arabic	 text,	 translation	 and	 com-
mentary	 by	 Charles	 Genequand,	Vrin,	 Paris	
2010.
6
The Epistle on the Possibility of Conjunction 
with the Active Intellect by Ibn Rushd, with 





Avempace,	 Iṭṭiṣāl al-‘aql bi-l-insān,	 §	 15:	
Fa	 bi-ḥuṣūl	 al-ma’qūlāt	 taḥduṯ	 aš-šahwa	 al-























drawn	 from	 real	 individual	 objects,	 and	 as	 such	 connected	with	 (multiple)	

















dinary	people	being	attentive	first	 to	 the	material	forms	and	only	after	 that	
to	 the	concepts).	The	 second	 is	 the	 level	of	 theoretical	 cognition,	which	 is	
the	culmination	of	natural	cognition	(a	theorist	paying	attention	first	of	all	to	






















































sal	 spiritual	 form”	 is	 ‘one	 in	 number’,	 and	




fa-yuẓann	 anna	 al-‘aql	 kaṯīr	wa	ḏālika	 anna	
al-muḍāfa	 muḍāf	 li-mā	 huwa	 muḍāf	 ilayhi	
wa	 li-mā	 kāna	 al-ma‘na	 al-ma‘qūl	 ‘inda-
hum	muḍāfan	wa	 ašḫāṣ	 iḍāfatuhu	 kaṯīra	 fa-




Taking	 different	 possibilities	 into	 account	
the	word	‘aql	and	how	it	can	be	understood,	
see	 further	 in	 this	 article	where	 it	 is	 shown	










fa-ḏālika	 laysa	 lahu	 ṣūratan	 rūḥāniyyatan	
mawḍū’atan	 lahu	 fa-l-‘aql	 yufham	 minhu	







l-ma‘qūl	 fī	waqt	 dūna	waqt	 yašbihu	 as-sa’y	
wa-l-quwwa	 allatī	 yartasimu	 fīha	 al-ma‘qūl	
tašbihu	 al-‘ayn	 wa-l-‘aql	 yašbihu	 al-ibṣār	
wa	 huwa	 aṣ-ṣūra	 al-murtasima	 fī-l-baṣr	 wa	
kamā	 anna	 tilka-ṣ-ṣūra	 hiya	 bi-ḍ-ḍū’	 fa-inna	
aḍ-ḍū’a	yūǧaduha	bi-l-fi‘l	wa	bihi	yartasimu	
fī-l-ḥāssa	fa-kaḏālika	al-‘aql	bi-l-fi’l	bi-ḏālika	
‘aql	 allaḏī	 laysa	 lahu	 šaḫṣ	 yuṣīru	 šay’an-mā	
wa	 yartasimu	 fī-l-quwwa	 wa	 kamā	 anna	
hāḏihi	 aṣ-ṣūra	 al-mubṣara	 hiya	 hg-hādiya	 lā	
aḍ-ḍū’	 al-mufrad	 kaḏālika	 hāḏa	 al-‘aql	 bi-l-
fi‘l	huwa	al-hādī.
15















Possible different interpretations of 
the ‘conjunction’ with the active intellect
Now	something	should	be	said	about	different	possible	interpretations	of	the	
idea	of	‘conjunction	with	the	active	intellect’.
Avempace	mentions	the	‘active	intellect’	in	his	Epistle on the Solitary Being,	
and	does	not	mention	 it	 in	 the	risāla under	consideration	here,	namely	 the	











this	 suggests	 that	 Genequand’s	 interpretation	 of	 the	 meaning	 of	 the	 word	
iṭṭiṣāl as	‘continuity’	rather	than	‘conjunction’18	–	bearing	in	mind	the	conti-
nuity	of	man’s	thinking	–	is	acceptable.	Still,	Avempace	does	mention	‘active	

















the	History of Islamic Philosophy,19	in	which	a	chapter	is	dedicated	to	Avem-
pace,	Lenn	E.	Goodman	says	that	Avempace	–	like	Al-Fārābī	and	Avicenna	
–	 believes	 that	 knowledge	 is	 not	 gained	only	 by	 the	 senses,	 that	 universal	
and	necessary	notions	are	realized	through	the	assistance	of	the	Active	Intel-
lect,	which	 is	 the	 incorporeal	 celestial	 intelligence	 governing	 the	 sublunar	
sphere.	As	an	argument	in	support	of	that,	Goodman	cites	Avempace’s	text	
Wuqūf ‘alä-l-‘aql al-fa“āl	(which	could	be	translated	as	Comprehending the 
Active Intellect,	or	Understanding the Active Intellect).	Contrary	to	that,	Ch.	
SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA	
62	(2/2016)	pp.	(345–358)

















tle	of	the	risāla differently,	explaining	that	Iṭṭiṣāl al-‘aql bi-l-insān	should	be	
understood	as	Continuity (or	integrality)	of the	Intellect in Man,	as	an	expres-
sion	of	the	idea	that	man	can	think	in	a	continuous	manner.20	Although	ques-









if	we	 look	 in	 a	dictionary	 searching	 for	 the	meaning	of	 the	word	 ‘aql,	we	
will	find	that	S.	M.	Afnan’s	dictionary21	says	that	Arabic	‘aql	translates	not	
only	 the	Greek	noūs	 (Metaphysics	 1074b20),	 but	 the	Greek	noēsis (Meta-
physics	1074b36)	as	well.	 In	support	Afnan	cites	several	examples,	 two	of	
which	could	be	cited	here:	“Thinking	is	not	but	cognition	of	the	constitution	
of	 existing	 things	 and	 of	 their	 order”	 from	Averroës’	Tahāfut;22	 or	 “When	
the	 rational	 soul	 acquires	 knowledge,	 its	 activity	 is	 called	 thinking”,	 from	
Avicenna’s	Risāla an-nafs.23	Bearing	this	meaning	of	the	word	‘aql	in	mind,	
it	would	be	possible	 to	suppose	 that	‘aql fa“āl	can	really	be	 interpreted	as	
an	expression	for	the	highest	function	of	intellect,	that	the	expression	iṭṭiṣāl 
bi-l-‘aql fa“āl	points	to	the	highest	form	of	thinking.	Afnan’s	dictionary,	for	





Cf.	Ibn	Bāǧǧa,	La conduite de l’isolé et deux 
autres épîtres,	p.	63.
19
Cf.	 History of Islamic Philosophy,	 ed.	 by	
Seyyed	 Hossein	 Nasr	 and	 Oliver	 Leaman,	
Routledge,	London	–	New	York	2007.
20
Cf.	Ibn	Bāǧǧa,	La conduite de l’isolé et deux 
autres épîtres,	“Introduction”,	p.	63.
21




Al-‘aql	 laysa	 huwa	 šay’an	 akṯar	 min	 idrāk	
niẓām	al-ašyā’	al-mawǧūda	wa	tartībaha.
23
















Thinking in Man,	or	Continuity of Man’s Thinking.
Besides,	dictionary	says	that	the	expression	 iṭṭaṣala bi-nā	means	‘we	came	
to	know’,	which,	as	it	seems,	no	translator	or	interpreter	took	into	account.	
Based	on	this,	 it	 is	plausible	to	understand	the	title	Iṭṭiṣāl al-ʻaql bi-l-insān	





What is Averroës’s understanding of 
iṭṭiṣāl bi-l-‘aql al-fa‘‘āl?
The	understanding	of	iṭṭiṣāl bi-l-‘aql al-fa“āl as	‘conjunction’	or	‘union’ with	
















Speaking	of	the	active	intellect	in	his	Epistle on the Possibility of Conjunction 
with the Active Intellect	Averroës	explicitly	says:






within	us	[…]	to	pass	from	potentiality	to	actuality,	it	is	as it were apart	from	the	hylic	intellect.	
The	function	and	its	conjunction	with	it	seems	to	resemble	more	the	conjunction of form in mat-
SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA	
62	(2/2016)	pp.	(345–358)
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ter	than	it	does	the	conjunction of agent with effect.	The	well-known	difference	between	agent	
and	effect	is	that	the	agent	is	external,	but	here there is no external agent.”26
This	quote	states	clearly	that	Averroës	does	not	see	the	active	intellect	as	the	


































The Epistle on the Possibility of Conjunction 




elsewhere	 in	 the	 passages	 cited	 from	Aver-
roës’	 text,	 the	 capital	 in	Active Intellect	 is	 a	
translator’s	 choice,	 which	 suggests	 that	 his	








































































































lect	Averroës	 is	simply	saying	 that	not	all	men	are	capable	of	 reaching	 the	
highest	level	of	cognizance.
Understandings of active intellect may be different, 
but its function is one
In	conclusion,	it	can	be	said	that	the	issue	of	the	active	intellect	in	Islamic	phi-
losophy	is	not	disambiguous.	Different	philosophers	understood	this	expres-




other	 things	by	 inspiring	man’s	 reason	 in	which	 it	produces	 ‘separate’,	 i.e.	
abstract,	notions,	enabling	it	to	apprehend	“higher”	forms.	On	the	other	hand,	
as	we	 tried	 to	 show,	 other	 thinkers,	 like	Avempace	 and	Averroës,	 saw	 the	
highest	function	of	man’s	intellect	in	the	‘active	intellect’,	which,	by	appre-
hending	itself	as	a	‘separated’,	i.e.	abstract,	substance,	reaches	its	perfection.	
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the	cause	does	not	communicate	to	its	effect	that	which	the	effect	does	not	








The	 same	 can	 be	 said	 of	Avempace.	Ch.	Genequand	 stresses	 the	 fact	 that	
Avempace	speaks	of	the	‘intellect’	in	most	of	cases	without	any	other	qualifi-
cation,	disregarding	all	definitions	of	different	intellects.35	So	it	is	no	accident	









Finally,	 it	 should	 be	 said	 that	 to	 think	 ideas	means	 thinking	 that	which	 is	





‘Djelatni um’ kod Avempacea i Averroësa: 
interpretativni problem
Sažetak
Tema ogleda je razumijevanje pojma djelatnog	 uma u Ibn Bāǧǧe (Avempacea) i Ibn Rušda 
(Averroësa). Tradicionalno tumačenje Avempaceova i Averroësova koncepta ‘djelatni um’ jest 
da ga obojica razumijevaju kao najnižu nebesku umnost, koja je dator	formarum, te da čovjek 
misli i spoznaje pojamnine jedino »povezujući« se s njime na gotovo mistički način, i da se spo-
znavanje sastoji u tome da čovjekovu umu djelatni um pribavlja ideje (formae, odnosno pojmo-
ve). Autor vjeruje da je i u Avempaceovoj i u Averroësovoj spoznajnoj teoriji pojam djelatnoga 
uma tek najviša funkcija ljudskoga uma, a ne neki nebeski entitet. Na takovoj pretpostavci te 
na raščlambi Avempaceove teorije zasniva se tumačenje po kojemu pojam iṭṭiṣāl	bi-‘aql	fa‘‘āl 
nije neka vrsta mističke »spregnutosti«, odnosno »sjedinjenosti« s nekim nebeskim entitetom, 
nego postizanje najviše razine funkcioniranja čovjekova uma u procesu mišljenja. Isto vrijedi 
za Averroësovu teoriju koja je prilično jasno izložena u njegovoj Poslanici	o	sprezi	s	djelatnim	
umom, u kojoj se može naći praktično izravna potvrda takove interpretacije, jer Averroës kaže 
da je »sprezanje s njime, čini se, više nalik spregnutosti oblika s tvarju no što bi bilo nalik sprezi 
činitelja s učinom. Dobro znana razlika između činitelja i učina je u tome što je činitelj izvanjski, 
a tu nema takovoga izvanjskog činitelja«, odnosno djelatni um je »s nama povezan od početka 
povezanošću su-bitka«, što znači da je čovjekov um podmet djelatnome umu. Autor zaključuje 
da pitanje djelatnoga uma u islamskoj filozofiji nije jednoznačno – za razne mislioce to je razli-
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Daniel Bučan
„Aktiver Intellekt“ bei Avempace und Averroës: 
ein interpretatives Problem
Zusammenfassung
Dieser Aufsatz handelt vom Verständnis des Begriffs des aktiven	 Intellekts bei Ibn Bāǧǧa 
(Avempace) und Ibn Ruschd (Averroës). Die traditionelle Interpretation von Avempaces und 
Averroës’ Begriff des aktiven Intellekts lautet, beide würden ihn als die niedrigste himmlische 
Intelligenz auslegen, die dator	formarum sei, und der Mensch denke und erkenne Intelligibles 
nur durch das „Verbinden“ damit in einer quasimystischen Weise, wobei die Erkenntnis darin 
bestehe, dass der aktive Intellekt dem menschlichen Intellekt Ideen (formae bzw. Begriffe) zu-
kommen lasse. Der Autor glaubt, der Begriff des aktiven Intellekts sei sowohl in Avempaces als 
auch in Averroës’ Erkenntnistheorie erst die höchste Funktion des menschlichen Intellekts, und 
nicht eine himmlische Entität. Basierend auf einer solchen Vermutung sowie auf der Analyse 
seiner Theorie wird Avempaces Begriff iṭṭiṣāl	bi-‘aql	 fa“āl nicht als eine Art mystische „Ver-
bindung“ oder „Vereinigung“ mit einem separaten himmlischen Wesen interpretiert, sondern 
als Erreichung der höchsten Ebene der Funktion des menschlichen Intellekts in der Kontinuität 
des Denkprozesses. Gleiches gilt für Averroës’ Theorie, die eher eindeutig in seiner Epistel	
über	die	Möglichkeit	der	Verbindung	mit	dem	aktiven	Intellekt ausgebaut wurde, wo man eine 
praktisch direkte Bestätigung für eine solche Auslegung finden kann, weil Averroës behauptet, 
„die Verbindung damit scheint mehr der Verbindung von Form und Materie zu ähneln, als sie 
der Verbindung von Agens und Wirkung ähnelt. Die wohlbekannte Differenz zwischen Agens 
und Wirkung besteht darin, dass das Agens extern ist, jedoch gibt es hier kein externes Agens“, 
bzw. dass der aktive Intellekt „sich von Anfang an mit uns verbindet durch die Verbunden-
heit des In-Seins“. Der Autor kommt zu dem Schluss, die Frage des aktiven Intellekts in der 
islamischen Philosophie sei nicht unzweideutig – für unterschiedliche Denker war es ein an-





« L’intellect agent » chez Avempace et Averroès : 
problème interprétatif
Résumé
Cet essai traite de la compréhension du concept d’intellect	agent chez Ibn Baja (Avempace) et 
Ibn Rochd (Averroès). L’interprétation traditionnelle de la notion d’intellect agent chez Avem-
pace et Averroès affirme qu’il s’agit d’une forme d’intelligence céleste inférieure, le dator	for-
marum,	et soutient l’idée selon laquelle l’homme pense et connaît les intelligibles uniquement 
en « se connectant » à lui de manière quasi mystique, la connaissance consistant en ce que l’in-
tellect agent amène les idées (formae, à savoir les concepts) à l’intellect de l’Homme. L’auteur 
pense que, dans la théorie de la connaissance d’Avempace et dans celle d’Averroès, le concept 
d’intellect agent représente tout au plus une fonction supérieure de l’intellect humain, et non 
pas une entité céleste. Sur la base de cette supposition et selon l’analyse de sa théorie, la notion 
de iṭṭiṣāl	bi-‘aql	fa‘‘āl d’Avempace n’est pas une sorte de « jonction » ou d’« union » mystique 
à une certaine entité céleste, mais plutôt l’acquisition du plus haut niveau de fonctionnement de 
l’intellect humain au sein du processus de la pensée. Il en va de même pour la théorie d’Aver-
roès qui est peu ou prou exposé dans son Epître	sur	la	possibilité	de	la	jonction, où il est possible 
de trouver une confirmation presque directe d’une telle interprétation puisqu’il est dit que « la 
jonction avec l’intellect agent semble davantage ressembler à la jonction de la forme à la ma-
tière plutôt qu’à la jonction de l’agent à l’effet. La différence bien connue entre l’agent et l’effet 
35
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consiste en cela que l’agent est extérieur, alors qu’ici il n’y a pas d’agent extérieur comme tel 
», à savoir l’intellect agent « se joint à nous au commencement par la jonction de l’intellect à 
l’existence ». L’auteur conclut que la question qui se rapporte à l’intellect agent dans la philo-
sophie islamique n’est pas univoque – c’est un concept qui varie selon les auteurs – et que la 
fonction de l’intellect agent est la seule qui reste toujours la même : la production d’idées.
Mots-clés
connaissance,	intellect	matériel,	intellect	hylique,	intellect	en	acte,	intellect	agent
